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1. Introduction 
 
This study reviews a host of issues related to international migration in Sub-
Saharan Africa and presents an overview of the state of the art of research and knowl-
edge. Its aim is to identify policies and research areas that will improve understanding 
and management of migration in Sub-Sahara Africa and help maximize the potential 
benefits of migration, especially for poor people, while minimizing its risks and costs. 
The study covers a broad range of issues in the migration literature, but is not exhaustive. 
This report first provides a historical overview of migration in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and then examines the scale and regional trends of migration. It explores the intersec-
tions between migration and labor market and the links between migration and develop-
ment. It also looks at institutions and policies and investigates issues related to politics, 
ethics, and migration before exploring implications for further investigation. 
 
2. Historical Overview 
 
Geographic mobility has always been an integral part of the social processes of  
groups around the world (Bilger and Kraler 2005). Facilitated in recent years by im-
proved transportation and communications and stimulated by large economic and social 
inequalities in the world, people are increasingly moving across international borders in 
an effort to improve their well-being and that of their family.  
Migration of human populations is generally recognized as an integral part of so-
cioeconomic development. It ensures the mobility of labor and its associated human capi-
tal between regions and occupations. In a competitive economy migration helps to bring 
factor markets in different geographical areas into equilibrium (Byerlee 1972). The eco-
nomic development of Western Europe and the United States was closely associated with 
the movement of labor from rural to urban areas (Todaro 1977). 
No generally accepted typology of migration flows exists, but the literature com-
monly classifies contemporary migration flows in Sub-Saharan Africa in temporal and 
spatial dimensions. The temporal aspect of migration relates both to the distance trav-
ersed and the duration of residence at the destination. In Sub-Saharan Africa migrations 
include seasonal migration, short-term migration for two to five years, and long-term or 
permanent migrations. Spatially, migrations may be rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to 
rural, or urban to urban (Amselle 1976).  
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Other less common typologies break migration into survival migration, in which 
push factors (economic, political, natural, or social distress) are largely responsible for 
the exit of people, and opportunity-seeking migration, in which pull factors (better oppor-
tunities) are largely responsible for the attraction of migrants. Chain and group migration 
are other types in Sub-Saharan Africa. In chain migration migrants rely on a network of 
social relations (friends, relatives, townfolk) to provide accommodations on arrival and 
assist in securing employment. Unlike voluntary migration, which derives mainly from 
economic factors, the reasons for mass or group migration within and across international 
borders in Sub-Saharan Africa are noneconomic and are related to political and religious 
factors and sometimes to natural disasters. 
The relative importance of each of these types of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
has varied historically. Seasonal migration between rural areas is important in areas of 
Sub-Saharan Africa with a pronounced dry season. Historically, seasonal migration to the 
forest during the dry season has been the most important and widespread in semi-arid ar-
eas (Byerlee 1979). Generally, migrants leave their farms in the savannah zone immedi-
ately after harvest in November–December and return for planting in April–May. Short-
term migration between rural and urban areas was important throughout Sub-Saharan Af-
rica during the colonial period. Typically, men migrated from their village for two to five 
years to work in mines, plantations, and factories, sometimes at considerable distance 
from their home. Often men would make such trips several times during their lifetime, 
giving rise to a circular pattern of migration. With increasing unemployment, the compe-
tition of a growing body of school leavers, and the closing of international boundaries, 
the short-term migrant has gradually phased into a permanent migrant, leading to rapid 
rates of urbanization accompanied by serious problems of urban unemployment. 
Anthropology of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Early analyses concluded that migration began in many Sub-Saharan African 
countries as a result of colonial policies and practices (Eicher and Baker 1984). This sim-
plistic view ignored the possible role of the pre-colonial environment (box 1). Today, it is 
increasingly accepted that understanding migration in Sub-Saharan Africa requires plac-
ing it within the anthropological context in which it originated. 
Africa has long been described as an extremely mobile continent. For example, 
European travelers in the nineteenth century deplored the “elusiveness” and instability of 
African settlements and villages, which were easily created and easily abandoned (Bilger 
and Kraler 2005). Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has long been characterized by 
slash-and-burn systems, with long fallow to restore soil fertility. Facing declining land 
productivity, farmers have adjusted by expanding cultivation into marginal land and 
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colonizing new forest areas, giving 
rise to the shifting cultivation prac-
tice (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; 
Nkamleu 1999). 
Past movements were trig-
gered by a variety of factors, 
though most were associated with 
the prevailing sociopolitical and 
ecological conditions, especially 
internecine warfare, natural disas-
ters, slavery, and the search for 
farm land (Adepoju 1998; Adedo-
kun 2003). It has been suggested 
that the contemporary phenome-
non of massive outmigration from 
the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Af-
rica may represent a continuation in a different guise of earlier migratory movements 
provoked by slavery and the slave trade on the continent (Mabogunje 1990).  
Migration within and between regions in Africa therefore reflected the general 
global pattern in which a set of push factors (a deteriorating economy, political instabil-
ity, droughts, and wars) were largely responsible for the exit of people from the sending 
areas, and a set of pull factors (relative economic prosperity, peace, stability) were re-
sponsible for the attraction of migrants to the receiving areas. As a result, the movements 
were unstructured and occurred in groups; the migrants were demographically undiffer-
entiated.  
This pre-colonial migration in Africa was basically oriented toward trade, labor, 
and religion (for pilgrimages) and occurred without legal restraints and barriers. The ab-
sence of strict legal restrictions made it possible for nomads, farm workers, seamen, trad-
ers, and preachers to migrate freely and frequently across international borders, even dur-
ing the colonial era (Adedokun 2003). These movements were generally circular, sea-
sonal, and of short duration. Pastoral nomads moved across countries in response to sea-
sonal climate change. Pastoralists moved between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Kenya 
and Tanzania, and between northern Nigeria and Cameroon, for example (Makinwa-
Adebusoye 2006). Sedentary farmers also moved seasonally in search of supplementary 
income during the slack dry farming season, moving from the drier interior into the plan-
tations (cocoa and coffee) of West Africa and also to the coastal farm estates (cotton and 
tea) of East Africa (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). 
Box 1. Pre-colonial migration context 
 
• Africa has long been described as an ex-
tremely mobile continent. 
• Villages were easily created and easily aban-
doned. 
• Movements were basically oriented toward 
trade, labor, and religion (for pilgrimages) 
and were without legal restraints and barri-
ers. 
• Movements were associated largely with 
prevailing sociopolitical and ecological con-
ditions, especially internecine warfare, natu-
ral disasters, slavery, and the search for farm 
land. 
• Little organized, these movements were gen-
erally circular, seasonal, and of short dura-
tion. 
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Colonial interferences 
The evolution of migration in the post-independence period since 1960 reflects 
the colonial strategies of the time (box 2). Various policies and activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa during both the colonial and post-colonial eras induced considerable rural labor 
movements at early stages in the development process (Mabogunje 1990).  
Rural migration began 
in many African countries as a 
result of colonial policies and 
practices that superimposed a 
monetized economy on peasant 
production (Eicher and Baker 
1984). Starting in the last quar-
ter of the nineteenth century, 
the mechanisms displacing mi-
grants from their rural homes 
were many and varied. A high 
degree of coercion was needed.  
Colonial tax systems, 
for example, required cash 
payments and therefore neces-
sitated wage work. The colonialists also introduced cash crops. In Eastern and Southern 
Africa white settlers monopolized this production; in West Africa (where climate and ma-
laria discouraged white settlers), tax and labor policies were used to induce Africans to 
produce cash crops for European markets. In many areas peasant cash crop production 
led indirectly to outmigration because cash crops disrupted the production of food crops, 
resulting in a need to engage in wage labor to pay for foodstuffs. In some areas cash 
cropping competes with subsistence crops for land, labor, and resources. While often 
more lucrative than food crops, cash crops also entail more risk; when prices fall, or are 
kept down by government policies, household income flows may be threatened, resulting 
in the need to migrate (Amselle 1976). 
Both the pattern of rural migration and the evolving character of the agrarian re-
sponse to it can be viewed as a consequence of the restructuring of local economies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa into the prevailing capitalist modes of production. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa restructuring involved the establishment of modes of agricultural production 
within what came to be identified as the colonial territories of various European nations 
(Mabogunje 1990). These colonial modes of production, beyond their more obvious ef-
fects on such matters as race relations, the land tenure system, and land availability, gen-
erally exerted a traumatic and momentous impact throughout the rural social structure. In 
Box 2. Colonization and migration 
 
• Tax policies coupled with unbalanced invest-
ment in the interior regions mobilized short-term 
laborers, who met their cash needs by migrating 
to work in mines and plantations. 
 
French colonial policy 
• French policy adopted forced labor recruitment 
as a means of mobilizing workers. 
• This policy was later regarded as unsatisfactory 
and replaced by tax levies on native population. 
British colonial policy  
• British policy introduced head taxes to encour-
age small farmers to produce cash crops and to 
sell their labor to European plantations and 
mines.  
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Sub-Saharan Africa labor rather than land has always been the factor of production in 
short supply. The mechanisms of procuring labor for these various modes of colonial 
production had far-reaching consequences for traditional institutional arrangements and 
rural class formation and provoked diverse responses to ensure the continued viability of 
agrarian economies in most parts of the region (Amselle 1976; Mabogunje 1990). 
Colonial strategies varied widely throughout Africa, making it difficult to general-
ize about the impact of these strategies. British colonial policy in Kenya, for example, 
promoted extensive European settlements. Much of the best land was reserved for Euro-
peans starting in the late 1890s. Head taxes were introduced to encourage small farmers 
to produce cash crops and to sell their labor to European plantations and mines. By con-
trast, British colonial policy in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone sharply 
restricted plantation development and settlement by white farmers. In fact, British colo-
nial policy in Nigeria prevented private plantations from gaining long-term control over 
land (Eicher and Baker 1984). 
In contrast to British policy, which restricted settlers and plantations in Nigeria, 
French policy encouraged Europeans to establish plantations to grow coffee and cocoa in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Initially, the French colonial administration in West Africa adopted some 
processes of forced labor recruitment. Until 1946 all men in French West Africa between 
the ages of 18 and 60 was subject by law to an annual corvée, requiring them to contrib-
ute a certain number of days’ labor to whatever enterprise the administration assigned 
them. 
Gradually, forced labor came to be regarded as unsatisfactory and was replaced 
by taxes. Officially, this system was justified on the grounds that the colonized people 
should contribute to the cost of their administration. In reality, the tax compelled the local 
populations to find ways of raising money and hence to participate in the emerging 
monetized capitalist-oriented economy (Mabogunje 1990). Gradually, Ivorians started to 
grow coffee and cocoa on small plots scattered throughout the forest, but since they used 
European techniques, they were called planters. 
In a study of rural outmigration in Mali, Mazur (1984) reported that the French 
undermined local craft production with cheap imported goods and imposed head taxes to 
mobilize the Malians as laborers, who met their cash needs by migrating to work on pea-
nut farms in Senegal and cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. This massive mi-
gration was exacerbated by the French strategy of contrived stagnation and unbalanced 
investment in the interior regions of West Africa. Vastly disproportionate investment oc-
curred throughout this period, particularly between 1945 and 1960, in the coastal areas 
(Mazur 1984). 
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In Eastern and Southern Africa migrants were not directly coerced. Rather, strong 
economic policies were used to induce men to work in the mines and plantations (Ade-
poju 1998). In South Africa, in particular, workers’ families have been prevented from 
living with them at work sites since 1963 (Adepoju 1998). This prohibition, coupled with 
low pay and poor working conditions, initially led to high labor turnover. These condi-
tions were designed to maintain low subsistence wages and promote a temporary and tar-
geted pattern of migration. 
Underlying theory and empirical approaches of migration research in Africa 
Research on migration and population mobility has long been an important sub-
ject in African studies. From a large review of the literature Eicher and Baker (1984) ar-
gue that there are three broad and interrelated schools of thought on migration: structural-
functionalist, neoclassical economics, and political economy. 
The structural functionalist approach has a long history. It examines the individ-
ual decision to migrate within a broad pattern of social relationships and social-structural 
conditions, including some economic variables. This approach generally presents a posi-
tive view of migration. 
Neoclassic economics treats migration as an economic phenomenon in which the 
migrant weighs the costs and returns from current and future employment opportunities. 
A turningpoint in migration research by neoclassical economists came with Todaro’s 
(1977) “expected incomes” model of migration. Todaro’s seminal contribution has pro-
vided a framework for much of the econometric work on migration in the past decade. 
The political economy approach views the historical expansion of capitalism as 
the main explanation for migration. It is assumed that while migration may improve the 
private economic return of individual migrants, the net short- and long-term social and 
economic effects of migration may be negative in the source area and positive in the re-
ceiving area. 
Some researchers (Miro and Potter 1980) argue that theory of international migra-
tion has not acquired any meaning in the field. The pattern, determinants, and conse-
quences of international migration seem to vary enormously between regions and often 
between countries, as well as over time. 
Until recently, migration research in Africa was almost exclusively the domain of 
anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers. Byerlee (1972) reviewed several hundred 
migration studies in Africa and reported that the bulk of the research over the 1950–70 
period was carried out by sociologists, geographers, and demographers relying on census 
data and cross-sectional surveys of migrants in urban areas. Much of the early research 
on migration tended to focus on social, cultural, and psychological factors, while recog-
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nizing, but not carefully evaluating, the importance of economic variables that influence 
migration (Todaro 1977).  
The factors influencing the decision to migrate are varied and complex. People 
who are considering changes in residence take into account many factors, including the 
monetary costs and returns from migration, the services and amenities available in the 
region of origin and destination, and the intangible costs of adapting to a new environ-
ment. Since migration is a selective process affecting individuals with certain economic, 
social, educational, and demographic characteristics, the relative influence of economic 
and noneconomic factors may vary not only between nations and regions but also within 
defined geographic areas and populations. 
Recent studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have concluded that economic motives are 
the primary determinant of the quantity and direction of migration flows between rural 
and urban areas (Byerlee 1972; Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). They use as a point 
of departure the theoretical work of Todaro, with migrants basing their decision on the 
discounted present value of the difference between urban expected income (taking into 
account the probability of finding a job) and rural expected income, less the cost of mov-
ing (Todaro 1977; Stier 1982). Age and level of education greatly influence the expected 
income differential. Artificially high wages in the urban formal sector (because of mini-
mum wage laws, for example) increase the differential between expected rural income 
and expected urban income and can induce increased rural-urban migration, even where 
urban unemployment is already substantial. Under this model, efforts to increase formal 
sector employment often induce migration and result in higher unemployment rates than 
in the source location. Invariably, every migration study in Africa concludes that the im-
migrants were mostly males in the young working ages and better educated than the aver-
age rural resident (Eicher and Baker 1984; Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980). 
Most recent work focuses on both migration and development. Increasing atten-
tion is being given to remittance flows, a major source of foreign capital for dozens of 
countries in the region (Ozden and Schiff 2006). 
Conclusion 
Rural-rural migrations have become common only since the first decade of the 
twentieth century, in response to demand for wage-earning labor of an emergent capitalist 
economy. Since the end of the Second World War the number of rural areas that attract 
migrant farmers has increased, as has the number of migrants into the cities. 
Colonial rule paved the way for peace and political stability, so that movements 
previously associated with internecine warfare ceased or were reduced. However, these 
movements have resurfaced in the form of refugees, as independent nations have engaged 
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in war (Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), internal conflict (the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Sudan), or political discord (Zimbabwe). Natural disasters such as the drought 
in the Sahel region of West Africa and parts of East Africa have dislodged many thou-
sands of people. The search for new and fertile land continues, and the number of land-
less poor has increased considerably, notably in East Africa. 
The economic theory of migration is similar to the theory of trade, but migration 
is a much more complex phenomenon. Like trade, migration is likely to enhance eco-
nomic growth and the welfare of both native inhabitants and migrants, and restrictions on 
migration are likely to have economic costs. However, people move for a variety of rea-
sons, by no means all economic. There are significant externalities—both social and eco-
nomic—to migration. Further economic conceptualization is needed to integrate all these 
aspects into a realistic migration framework. 
 
3. Scale, Structure, and Regional Trends of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Measuring migration is difficult, and commonly estimated migration rates pose 
special problems of interpretation. For example, the definition of international migrant 
residents differs from country to country and from survey to survey, sometimes being de-
fined as foreign-born and sometimes as a foreign national. Some classifications are based 
on the ethnicity of the parent; others on the place of birth. To complicate matters, much 
of the international migration in Africa occurs outside of a regulatory framework (ECA 
2005; Kanyenze 2004; Adedokun 2003). In addition, the usual estimate for net urban 
growth due to migration (urban growth rate less national growth rate) may be inflated by 
the reclassification of rural areas as urban areas. 
The most common sources of information for migration research are national cen-
sus reports on the numbers of foreign-born or foreign nationals. But census data are not 
available for many countries, and even when they exist, there are several sources of 
potential bias. However, census data provide a fairly solid, conservative baseline estimate 
of the numbers of migrants and the general directions of their movement (Page and Plaza 
2005; Lucas 2005). This section relies on estimates of migrant stocks compiled by the 
United Nations Population Division and some scattered data from various other sources 
to identify trends in migration in different regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa migration is extremely unstable over time. Among the 
countries in the world with the highest coefficient of variation in the net migration rate in 
the past 50 years, the top 4, and 22 of the top 50, are in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lucas 2005). 
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West Africa 
In a survey of research on 
the migration stock in West Af-
rica, Stier (1982) argues that the 
volume of emigration was light 
until 1923 and then increased 
from 1924 to 1932 (box 3). 
Forced recruitment for work in-
creased in the plantations of Côte 
d’Ivoire, but Ghana remained the 
principal destination until 1932. 
The partitioning of Upper Volta 
(later Burkina Faso) among Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger in 1932 
facilitated conscription, and the 
flow of workers to Côte d’Ivoire 
increased. Forced labor was offi-
cially abolished between 1936 
and 1939, but administrative pressure increased the amount of semivoluntary emigration 
to Côte d’Ivoire from roughly 4,000 to 9,500 people. Forced labor was reinstituted in 
1940, and the number of Voltaic (now Burkinabe) workers in Côte d’Ivoire reached 
roughly 71,000 by 1942. With the abolition of forced labor and the reconstitution of Up-
per Volta, emigration to Ghana increased for a few years, but Côte d’Ivoire became the 
principal destination after 1950. In Togo there was little investment during the colonial 
period, and many public sector jobs were held by Dahomeyans. Many Togolese emi-
grated. By 1925–30 there were at least 75,000 Togolese nationals in Ghana, and by 1960 
there were 280,000 (Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980). 
In Soudan Français (Mali) the motivation for young men to take up seasonal work 
in the groundnut regions of Senegambia was, as in Upper Volta, mostly to escape re-
cruitment for forced labor and to earn money to pay taxes (Stier 1982). The number of 
Sudanian workers in the groundnut areas may have reached 25,000–30,000 by 1920–21 
(Stier 1982). The numbers fell sharply in the early 1930s as earnings fell with the drop in 
the world groundnut price, but rose to 34,000 by 1938 and continued to fluctuate between 
roughly 7,000 and 25,000 through 1960 (Stier 1982).  
Migration from Guinea (particularly the Fouta Djallon) followed a similar pattern. 
Before the First World War the major groups to migrate were recently freed slaves (Stier 
1982). Emigration increased in volume in the years after the war as military recruitment 
and forced labor conscription intensified and as households found themselves unable to 
Box 3. Chronology of migration in West Africa 
 
• Migrations were light until 1923. 
• From 1924 to 1932 there was increasing forced 
recruitment for work in the plantations of Côte 
d’Ivoire. But Ghana was still the principal des-
tination until 1932. 
• There were at least 75,000 Togolese nationals 
in Ghana by 1925–30. By 1960 the number 
had risen to 280,000. 
• Forced labor was officially abolished from 
1936–39, but Côte d’Ivoire became the princi-
pal destination only after 1950. 
• The number of Voltaic (now Burkinabe) work-
ers in Côte d’Ivoire reached roughly 71,000 by 
1942. 
• The number of Malian workers in the ground-
nut areas of Senegambia reached roughly 
30,000 by 1920 and fell to around 20,000 by 
1960. 
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cultivate sufficient cash crops (rubber and coffee) to pay their taxes. By 1956 roughly 
10,000–15,000 Guineans had emigrated to Kedegou in eastern Senegal, and approxi-
mately another 14,000 had settled in the Casamance (Baldé 1975). 
Seasonal migration from Guinea to the groundnut areas of Senegambia began in 
the early 1920s (Stier 1982). By 1932, 10,000 Guinean seasonal workers were registered 
in Senegal; the number of seasonal emigrants from Guinea had increased to 35,000 by 
1936. Most came from the Fouta Djallon. As of 1975 the principal sending areas for emi-
grants, by decreasing order of importance, were Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Togo 
(see Annex table A.1). Together, these countries supplied almost 73 percent of the re-
gion’s total foreign nationals. The most important receiving area, by far, was Côte 
d’Ivoire, followed by Ghana and Senegal. 
The proportion of West Africa immigrants in the total population varied widely as 
of 2005, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent in Mali to a high of 15.3 percent in The Gam-
bia (Annex table A.2). Immigrants constituted almost 3 percent of the total population in 
West Africa in 2005. Many countries in the region alternate between being net immigrant 
and net emigrant areas.  
Central Africa 
In Central Africa movements of refugees have been a major—and in some cases 
the main—component of international migration flows among mainly neighboring coun-
tries. On average, refugees constituted 38.8 percent of the international migrants of the 
region (Annex table A.3). Together with East Africa, Central Africa is the main host of 
refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. The larger country sources of refugees are Angola, Bu-
rundi, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In addition however, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Mauri-
tania each generated more than six refugees per thousand of the population. Several ma-
jor countries of refugee origin were also important countries of asylum, including Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Lucas 
2005). Distinctions between refugees and other migrants are not always apparent because 
of ethnic similarities across borders. 
For the 2000–05 period Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo had a net 
loss of migrants, while the other countries in Central Africa experienced a net gain (An-
nex table A.4). The migration growth rate is particularly noticeable in Chad, largely be-
cause of the vast movement of refugees from Sudan and voluntary immigrants seeking 
jobs in oil companies. The share of migrants as a percentage of the population is particu-
larly high in Gabon. Almost 18 percent of the population of Gabon are immigrants. 
 11 
Dealing with forced displacement continues to be an important issue in Central 
Africa. There is considerable scope to facilitate regional networks to support recent initia-
tives focusing on developing a regional framework for refugee protection. 
East Africa 
East Africa has a long history of labor migration between and within countries to 
plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), to mines (the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Uganda), and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda) (DFID 2004a). Workers from Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, and Rwanda 
were recruited to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda for employment on agricultural estates. 
In the post-colonial era these movements have been supplemented by substantial forced 
displacement and increasing rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to 
earn a livelihood. However, both urbanization rates and levels of international migration 
generally remain lower than in other parts of Africa. 
The proportion of East African immigrants in the total population fell from 3.5 
percent in 1975 to 1.6 percent in 2005, due mainly to return migration after the end of 
military strife in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Annex table A.5). 
Some countries in this region host a relatively large number of immigrants. More than 18 
percent of the population in Réunion in 2005 was immigrant, for example. 
Labor circulation forms a particularly important part of migration within East Af-
rica. Many countries in the region have experienced substantial movements of refugees 
and internally displaced people (DFID 2004a). In particular, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda host substantial refugee populations. It is not unreasonable to expect that the re-
turn flow of refugees will increase in the coming years. The region needs to begin devel-
opment of a regional policy framework to address this future shift. 
Southern Africa 
In Southern Africa, 
labor migration historically 
took the form of circular mi-
gration guided by specific 
legal frameworks and state 
policies. Workers from Leso-
tho, Malawi, and Swaziland 
regularly engaged in short-
term circulatory migrations 
to work in the mining areas 
and tobacco farms of the 
Box 4. Chronology of migration in Southern Africa 
 
• The history of migrant labor in Southern Africa is 
tied to the capitalist development of plantations 
and mining and dates from the 1850s. But the min-
ing sector played the dominant role. 
• The mines and plantations in Mauritius, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe at-
tracted many migrant laborers, mainly for tempo-
rary work. 
• South Africa was the most important destination. 
In 1870 around 50,000–80,000 migrants came to 
work in the diamond mines in Kimberley. 
• Witwatersrand Native Labor Association has been 
effective in establishing recruitment stations and 
moving labor from neighboring countries. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (DFID 2004b; box 
4). Transborder migrations during the colonial period occurred largely between neighbor-
ing countries, which were separated by arbitrarily drawn boundaries that sometimes cut 
across the homelands of ethnic and language groups.  
South Africa has been at the center of the migration process in the region. Official 
policies in South Africa directly recruited workers or indirectly induced Africans to seek 
employment as mine or agricultural workers (through taxes, for example). State policies 
also deliberately created labor reserves. The transformation of rural South Africa and 
Rhodesia, as well as of Lesotho and Swaziland, into labor reserves for the South African 
economy had tremendous social and political impacts and also lay at the heart of South 
Africa’s Bantustan policy (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006; Bilger and Kraler 2005). 
From 1980 to 1985 countries such as Lesotho and South Africa received a high 
influx of migrants (Annex table A.6). These migrants came from various parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (Adepoju 2006). Mi-
grants constituted a particularly high share of the population in most of the countries in 
that region during that period. Since 1985 the migrant stock has fallen steadily in Lesotho 
and South Africa, while continuing to increase in other countries of the region.  
Some source countries of migration have become destination countries, while in 
others economic and political events have led to large fluctuations in migration trends. 
Although South Africa is frequently mentioned as a principal destination for migrants in 
the region, United Nations population data suggest that there is an increasing shift of des-
tination toward neighboring countries such as Botswana and Namibia, where the migrant 
share of the population is highest. 
Conclusion 
There are almost no direct data on migration flows in Sub-Saharan Africa. To 
analyze the dimensions and patterns of migration in the region, researchers must rely on 
estimates of migrant stocks derived from incomplete and potentially biased census results 
(Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). Nonetheless, these sources present a compelling 
picture of migration in the different regions of the continent. African migration is still 
primarily intraregional. However, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration, 
diversity has been increasing both in the countries from which international migrants 
originate and in their countries of destination.  
During the last few decades, as economic and political instability deepened in 
many regions, fewer migrants found stable and remunerative work in traditional regional 
destinations. Consequently, migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has expanded to a wide va-
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riety of alternative destinations and sometime to places without any historical, political, 
or economic links to the countries of origin. Migration also became more varied and 
spontaneous, with rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation. 
Although useful data exist, there are still key data gaps on migrations and dis-
placements within the regions. Comprehensive data on the scale, structure, and character-
istics of migrants in different regions are still lacking and constitute the primary obstacle 
to investigation of likely patterns of future emigration expansion. 
 
4. Migration and Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
There have been numerous studies of the impact of immigration on labor markets 
in host countries. By contrast, studies of the impact of emigration on labor markets in 
countries of origin are extraordinarily scarce (Lucas 2005). For Sub-Saharan Africa in-
formation on the movement of highly skilled workers is very limited, so the literature 
tends to focus on theoretical analysis of migration. 
Migration and labor markets in receiving countries 
Analyses of the impact of migration on labor markets have traditionally focused 
on variables such as unemployment levels and the real wages of native workers in host 
countries (Solimano 2001). The impacts of immigration on the labor markets of the 
world’s wealthier nations have been much studied. Some of the patterns of immigration 
within Sub-Saharan Africa reflect very similar concerns. The literature highlights the fact 
that regional voluntary migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by the oppor-
tunity to work.  
The impacts of migrants on destination country labor markets are diverse. Mi-
grants are heterogeneous, differing at least as much from one another as from the general 
population. The experiences of migrants are usually more polarized than those of the 
population as a whole, with larger concentrations at the extremes for such factors as 
wealth and poverty, and high and low skills (Glover and others 2001).  
Consequently, migrants have mixed success in the labor market. Some migrants 
are very successful, but others are unemployed or inactive. In part, labor market success 
is influenced by such characteristics as education, willingness to do “dirty jobs,” foreign 
language fluency, and labor demand.  
There are motivational and decisionmaking differences between immigrants from 
developed countries and those from developing countries. Push and pull factors play dif-
ferent roles. Most people from developed countries do not migrate without having good 
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employment prospects, whereas this is not necessarily the case for migrants in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Migrants from developed countries typically find employment first and 
then determine whether their incomes are comparable to those of the rest of the local 
workforce—pull factors predominant. Push factors—because of the absence of economic 
opportunities in home countries—are more important for migrants from developing coun-
tries than for migrants from developed countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa many migrants 
tend to gravitate toward areas of relative prosperity and low housing costs (and areas 
where housing is available) and where others from their home country already live. Thus 
they tend to concentrate in cities and in particular sectors, such as mines and plantations. 
Migrants bring diverse skills, experience, and know-how. In theory, migration is 
important for addressing skill shortages at all levels and for fostering innovation and new 
business and job creation. There is considerable support for the view that migrants create 
new businesses and jobs and fill labor market gaps, improving productivity. However, 
case study evidence of migrants’ labor market performance in destination countries 
shows that most immigrants from developing countries, regardless of destination, suffer 
an earnings penalty (Page and Plaza 2005).  
This usually poses the problem of the transferability of immigrant characteristics. 
A number of empirical studies use the Chiswik (1978) and Borjas (1985) Immigrant Hu-
man Capital Model under different econometric specifications to quantitatively estimate 
the economic returns to immigrants attributes (Glover and others 2001; Page and Plaza 
2005), but no such study has been carried out for Africa. This model takes into account 
the probability that the stock of an immigrant’s human capital obtained in the origin 
country may not be fully transferable to the requirements of the destination country’s la-
bor market. The model predicts a negative relationship between the transferability of hu-
man capital and the initial, upon arrival, immigrant-native earnings gap. The lower the 
international transferability of human capital, the higher is the earnings disadvantage at 
the time of migration. To narrow this wage gap, migrants invest in country-specific hu-
man capital in the receiving country and adapt their stock of human capital acquired in 
the country of origin. This form of investment is what economists call economic assimila-
tion (Page and Plaza 2005). 
Large and sudden refugee inflows occur far more commonly in Africa than else-
where. Moreover, clandestine migration is pervasive throughout the region and consid-
ered routine in West Africa, where seasonal migration also figures more prominently than 
elsewhere on the continent (Byerlee 1979; Adepoju 1988). This situation continues to put 
heavy pressure on the domestic labor market of some countries, creating a growing feel-
ing in some countries that native workers are harmed by migration. An increasingly hos-
tile reception is already perceptible in some countries, with growing xenophobia, appre-
hension of foreigners, and anti-immigrant political mobilization. Rising illegal migration 
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reflects a number of factors, including rising demand in the labor market, particularly at 
the lower end, and other exogenous pressures (including economic, social, and political 
instability in the country of origin). However, the economic impacts of these flows on the 
countries of asylum remain both little studied and poorly understood. 
Recent research at the global level (UN 2005) reveals that migration does not 
have a significant impact on labor markets in receiving countries, particularly over the 
medium term. The reason is that migrants increase not only the labor supply but also the 
demand for goods and services in the host country. In addition, some use their entrepre-
neurial abilities to set up businesses. These activities, and their dynamic and multiplier 
effects, increase the demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply 
that migrants represent. Testing these observations in the African context would certainly 
add value to the existing research. 
As a result of the economic recession throughout Sub-Saharan Africa recent arri-
vals face greater challenges and competition in labor markets. Where integration into la-
bor markets is especially difficult, some immigrants establish businesses as alternatives. 
Immigrant self-employment and entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa have not been 
well researched. Scattered studies have reported, for example, that in South Africa the 
post-apartheid waves of immigrants from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zim-
babwe are mostly street vendors and traders seeking to capitalize on the relatively afflu-
ent market of South Africa. These entrepreneurs, who work mostly in the informal sector, 
import traditional African clothing and handicrafts, employ and train locals, and gener-
ally invigorate the informal sector. More research is needed to assess how lack of access 
to employment opportunities commensurate with immigrants’ human capital characteris-
tics may encourage them to look for business alternatives through self-employment. 
Migration and labor markets in sending countries 
Migration also has implications for the labor markets of countries of origin. The 
number of skilled and unskilled migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa countries has in-
creased dramatically over the past four decades, although data on the share of populations 
that work outside their borders are unavailable and data on the share of emigrants who 
are hosted by other African countries are severely limited.  
Theory suggests that migration of predominantly unskilled labor, by reducing the 
supply of this class of labor in the sending country, raises the salaries of unskilled work-
ers in the sending countries. This narrows the wage-income distribution, improving in-
come equality (Solimano 2001). However, these trends need to be confirmed empirically 
for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Recent debate on the effect of migration on labor has focused on the emigration of 
professionals (brain drain) and the loss of skilled labor, which may be occurring faster 
than the replacement rate. The debate originally claimed that rich countries were becom-
ing richer because of the transfer of high skills from developing countries.  
During the 1970s the debate changed, and even the terminology was replaced by 
terms such as “reverse technology transfer” and “cooperative exchange of skills between 
developing countries” (Page and Plaza 2005). One implication is that investment in edu-
cation in a developing country may not lead to economic growth if highly educated peo-
ple leave their countries. Developing countries that subsidize higher education may lose 
doubly through an additional loss in public resources invested in education. They also 
lose the future contributions that highly educated people would have made to the eco-
nomic development of the home country, including future tax payments (Lucas 2005; 
Ozden and Schiff 2006). The significance of the brain drain for development is under-
scored by the new growth theory, which argues that a person’s knowledge not only pro-
vides a direct benefit in terms of available skills but also has positive effects on the pro-
ductivity of others (UN 2005). Emigration of those with skills eliminates this indirect 
benefit to the economy at large. 
Recent partial studies point to the magnitude of the phenomenon of brain drain in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006) reports that, on average, African mi-
grants have three times as many years of schooling as the national average at the mi-
grants’ destination. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO 2003), up to 
75 percent of people emigrating from Africa to the United States, Canada, or other OECD 
countries have completed university-level studies or equivalent technical training. Since 
the mid-1980s, when the economies of many African countries worsened drastically, 
many highly skilled workers have left Africa, including doctors and nurses who received 
training at great public expense. 
The migration of medical personnel is especially extreme. About 600 first-
generation medical specialists from Nigeria work in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and up to 
12,000 are in the United States (Adepoju 2006). In South Africa white doctors emigrated 
to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted by higher in-
comes and troubled by the South African government’s policy requiring service in rural 
areas and fearful of the rise in crime. An estimated 60 percent of Zimbabwean doctors 
recently moved to Botswana and South Africa. Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006) reported on 
the case of Ghana, which exemplifies how damaging the brain drain can be. From 1995 
to 2002 nearly a quarter of various cadres of health workers trained in Ghana emigrated, 
including more than two-thirds of medical officers (general practitioners). Workloads for 
remaining personnel rose steeply, contributing to poorer health care in Ghana. 
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The general issues pertaining to brain drain are well known. First, the withdrawal 
of any factor of production, such as highly skilled labor, diminishes returns to other fac-
tors remaining at home. However, the distribution of those losses among the owners of 
capital, and unskilled and skilled workers depends on the nature of technology and thus 
on the degree of substitution that may occur. Moreover, the extent of these losses is af-
fected by how productively the highly skilled workers are employed before their depar-
ture. Such broad concerns apply to the emigration of any type of labor. However, a sec-
ond line of concern is more specific to the departure of highly skilled labor. Emigration 
of highly skilled labor may impose various externalities. Three potential forms of exter-
nal benefits from the continued presence of highly skilled labor have been distinguished 
(Lucas 2005): their effects on the productivity of others, their influence on economic 
growth, and their contribution as key personnel in the delivery of specific services and 
social goods. Each of these remains controversial. 
A recent feature in the brain drain literature is the “brain gain” hypothesis (Schiff 
2005). This new literature posits that the brain drain raises the expected return on educa-
tion because of the share of skilled individuals who migrate and earn a higher wage 
abroad, thus inducing additional investment in education (brain gain). This may result in 
a beneficial brain drain or a net brain gain: that is, a brain gain larger than the brain drain. 
A net brain gain raises welfare and growth.  
This line of reasoning illustrates the complexity of the impact of brain drain and 
its multidimensionality. Adepoju (1988) reports some evidence to support a pattern of 
replacement migration, with rural migrants moving to towns to occupy positions vacated 
by migrants who emigrate abroad. This seems to be occurring in Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Mali. The same seems to hold true for Senegal (where urban work-
ers go to France) and Egypt (whose migrants move to Persian Gulf countries). In some 
cases immigrants from neighboring countries occupy positions vacated by nationals who 
have emigrated, yielding a step-by-step migration pattern, first from rural areas to cities, 
from cities to cities in the same country or regions, and then from cities to foreign desti-
nations. 
The case of agricultural labor 
The links between migration and agriculture are especially important in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where close to 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and prac-
tice some form of subsistence farming. Migration and agriculture are related in two ways. 
Changes in the agricultural sector lead to changes in migration flows, while migration 
affects food production and agricultural development.  
Historically, migration has been viewed favorably in the development literature 
because it was perceived to reduce intraregional and interregional wage differentials and 
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to assist in transferring new crops and ideas over wide areas (Eicher and Baker 1984). 
Migrants have been characterized as innovators, risk takers, and entrepreneurs. Hill’s 
(1963) pioneering research revealed that migrants were the risk takers in settling land and 
mobilizing capital in Ghana’s cocoa boom in the late nineteenth century. Using a human 
capital model of migration, Vijverberg (1989) concludes that rural areas lose their pro-
ductive workers and that urban areas may gain in productivity from the geographic shifts 
in population from rural to urban zones. Eicher and Baker (1984) argue that the migration 
of rural people for work in plantations, mines, and factories has been a major catalyst for 
social change in Africa. 
Migration across and within national boundaries affects the distribution of re-
sources—especially human capital. When millions of people are involved, as in West Af-
rica, the economic and social effects of migration are important to the development of 
both the countries of origin and those of destination (Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980). 
Essang and Mabawonku (1974) found that in Nigeria emigration is associated with in-
creases in hired labor, increases in farm size, higher rural earning per person, and a net 
transfer of capital from rural to urban areas. 
In West Africa commercial agriculture is the principal employment sector for all 
countries in the region (Nkamleu 2004). Agricultural migration occurs principally from 
the savannah hinterland to Côte d’Ivoire cocoa plantations and to the groundnut farms of 
The Gambia and Senegal. The main migration streams are from Burkina Faso to Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana, and from Mali and Guinea to Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia and 
Senegal (Adepoju 1988).  
Agricultural migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is seasonal, mainly on a north-south 
axis, and largely spontaneous and uncontrolled (Adepoju 1988). Throughout rural Africa 
family labor is the most important resource in household production, and hired labor is 
the largest production expense. At the peak season—usually July and August—labor is 
generally a bottleneck in agricultural production. There is a widespread and competitive 
labor market to allocate labor within households, villages, regions, and even across inter-
national boundaries (Byerlee 1979; Byerlee et al. 1977).  
Seasonal migration has been of central importance in providing labor for farming 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Dupire’s (1960) study of Côte d’Ivoire is a classic on the 
role of seasonal migrants. Swindell (1995) and Stier (1982) report that many of the farm-
ers in the groundnut basin in Senegal are seasonal farmers. Seasonal farmers have been 
migrating to the basin annually from April to December since the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, when groundnuts were first exported from the basin. Seasonal migration 
is also significant in the semi-arid areas of Africa, where migrants move from the savan-
nah zone (such as Burkina Faso) to the forest zones (such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana) 
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during the dry season (November to April) to harvest and maintain tree crops (cocoa, oil 
palm, and rubber). In Ghana some 200,000 people from the savannah area of the north 
migrate annually to the south to participate in cocoa harvesting and maintenance of cocoa 
trees (Beals and Menezes 1970). 
An increasing number of studies focus on how the characteristics of origin and 
destination areas and of migrants, their households, and their communities shape particu-
lar population flows (Ouensavi and Kielland 2001; Kielland and Sanogo 2002). Yet this 
type of analysis has not been applied to agriculture. Agricultural migration is dynamic 
and evolves with the changing nature of today’s commercial agriculture. New facts and 
new research in this field are certainly warranted. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the interaction of migration and labor markets is hampered by lack of 
data and empirical research on the subject. However, it is clear that Africa has high mi-
gration rates compared with other large developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, and Indonesia. This is particularly so for highly skilled workers. More than 40 
percent of the highly skilled population of some small African countries live and work 
abroad (including doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, scientists, and technologists). But 
very little is known about their numbers or their destinations on the continent. Informa-
tion is still lacking on the composition, concentration, and sectoral impact of migrations 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. These impacts are important for understanding not only the con-
sequences of the withdrawal of highly skilled workers, but also the labor market adjust-
ments to the departure of less skilled workers.  
Some basic questions pertaining to the effects of regional migration urgently need 
to be addressed: Does migration induce higher wages for those who stay behind? Is inter-
nal migration stimulated to replace departing workers? Both international and internal 
movements, and the direction of the flow, affect the development of the labor market of 
individual countries and might contribute to regional growth. Similarly, little is known 
about the labor market experiences and assimilation of returning migrants, including for-
eign students and other highly skilled people, short and longer term workers, and repatri-
ated refugees. 
Migrants constitute a considerable share of the labor force in developing coun-
tries. The magnitude of migration will continue to be an important determinant of the 
supply of new job seekers. An understanding of the relationship between migration and 
labor markets in each country and region is central to any analysis of employment prob-
lems in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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5. Migration and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Among the gaps in knowledge about the impact of migration in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, an important one is the relationships between migration and development. This is 
particularly the case with estimates of the scale of remittances and their impact on the 
livelihood and well-being of households and nations. Another area where information is 
lacking is on the impact of migrants on the labor markets of host countries and on host 
countries more broadly. 
Migration and remittances 
In contrast to the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain is the financial 
transfer to the home country represented by the remittances sent by migrants to their 
families. Remittances have been at the center of debates in the literature about the costs 
and benefits of migration. Reliable data on remittances are hard to come by. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) 
reported that global transfers of 
remittances have grown stead-
ily in the last 10 years and ex-
ceeded $100 billion worldwide 
to developing countries in 2004 
(IMF 2005). A recent World 
Bank study estimates that re-
mittance flows have doubled in 
the last decade, reaching $216 
billion in 2004, with $150 bil-
lion going to developing coun-
tries (Ozden and Schiff 2006).  
Data on remittances are 
incomplete and almost cer-
tainly underestimate their true 
magnitude because they do not 
accurately reflect funds and goods in kind flowing through nonreporting and informal 
channels. First, most remittance source countries do not require the reporting of “small” 
transactions. Also, remittances through post offices, exchange bureaus, and other money 
transfer companies are often not reflected in official statistics.  
Second, official data do not capture remittance flows through informal channels, 
which are believed to be large. Recent studies attempting to estimate the size of unofficial 
remittances worldwide yield quite different results. El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson 
Box 5. Summary data on remittances in  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
• Some $4 billion in remittances were officially 
received in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2002. This 
figure represents 5 percent of total remittances to 
developing regions—the same as the fraction of 
migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa relative to to-
tal migration from the developing world. 
• Official data are believed to severely underesti-
mate the true magnitude of remittances. Some 
estimates put global remittances at 2.5 times the 
size reported in the IMF balance of payments 
data. 
• For most countries remittances exceed the vol-
ume of foreign aid and investment. For example, 
the total amount sent back by the 60,000 illegal 
Malians in France is about 100 million euros; of-
ficial French aid to Mali is 60 million euros. 
 21 
(2003), in a study for the IMF, estimate that unofficial transfers of remittances to the de-
veloping world amount to $10 billion a year. Page and Plaza (2005) report that some es-
timates of global remittances are 2.5 times the size reported in the IMF balance of pay-
ments data. Available data do agree, however, that remittances have grown in parallel 
with the number of international migrants and that for most countries remittances exceed 
the volume of foreign aid and investment (UN 2005; Adams 2005). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa some $4 billion in remittances were received in 2002 
(Sander and Maimbo 2003). At 5 percent of total remittances to developing regions, this 
amount is proportional to the share of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in total migrants 
from the developing world. The Bank of Ghana estimates that informal flows to Ghana 
are at least as high as these recorded flows (Lucas 2005), so that total remittances would 
be at least double this amount.  
One reason for the large underestimation of remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa is 
that most remittances are sent from other countries within the region. In Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, as in East Asia and South Asia, more than two-thirds of emigrants from poor coun-
tries migrate to a country in the same region (Page and Plaza 2005). In South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa most emigrants migrate to another developing country. Most of them 
send their remittances through informal operators or travelers. Household surveys of 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Uganda show widespread use of informal channels for remit-
tances (Page and Plaza 2005). In East Africa a range of innovative informal remittance 
channels have developed to facilitate intracountry flows through bus and courier compa-
nies (DFID 2004a).  
Another reason for the large underestimation is that unrecorded flows appear to be 
high in Africa, especially in certain countries (Sander and Maimbo 2003). In Sudan, for 
example, informal remittances are estimated to account for 85 percent of total remittance 
receipts. The use of informal routes for money transfer is also encouraged by the illegal 
status of migrants in some countries. For example, Azam and Gubert (2005) estimate that 
the 60,000 illegal Malians in France send remittances totaling about 100 million euros. 
Despite the scarcity of data, the literature agrees that this is an important but 
poorly understood type of international financial flow. Given the size of remittances, re-
searchers and development practitioners are now focusing on both the development im-
pact of remittances and on regulatory issues in sender and receiver markets. 
Remittances and development 
Even without firm data the importance of remittances as a source of development 
financing is becoming clear to policymakers in developing countries, who seek to deter-
mine how best to make use of these human and financial resources. That overall, remit-
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tances create a stable net positive transfer is becoming widely accepted. Through their 
effects on foreign exchange reserves, balance of payments, livelihoods, and investments 
in human capital, remittances are important, particularly for African households and na-
tions. A noteworthy development has been the formation of hometown associations in 
countries of destination, through which migrants collect funds to send back to the com-
munity of origin for financing local development projects.  
The case of Burkina Faso, located in the drier Sahel region of West Africa, exem-
plifies the importance of remittances emanating from migrations within Africa (Mak-
inwa-Adebusoye 2006). Burkina Faso is a major source of migrant laborers into coastal 
areas for the production of primary export crops, notably cocoa and coffee, in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Until the recent civil war in Côte d’Ivoire remittances from migrants accounted 
for about a quarter of Burkina Faso’s GDP (Black, King, and Tiemoko 2003) and helped 
to keep entire families alive. 
Still, the macroeconomic effects of remittance inflows remain poorly modeled 
and poorly understood. One of the most important findings of recent research concerns 
the role remittances play in linking geographically separated family members (Russell, 
Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). Sub-Saharan Africa has featured prominently in the empiri-
cal literature on migration as a family risk-spreading strategy, with remittances offering 
relief in times of adversity. Studies in the region have looked at the impacts on remit-
tances from rainfall shocks, affecting both cropping and livestock, as well as from shocks 
arising through ill health or death in the family (Lucas 2005). Studies in East Africa have 
shown that rural families increase their livelihood security by diversifying the location of 
family members. Research in western Kenya suggests that the decision to migrate, and 
remittance behavior, are linked to a form of intergenerational “migration contract” be-
tween migrants and their parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends 
remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance (DFID 2004a). Azam and Gubert 
(2005) found a similar pattern in Mali. 
In contrast to the lack of macro data on remittances, a number of studies have ap-
peared on the micro determinants of remittances and their impact on development in spe-
cific contexts within Sub-Saharan Africa. Many studies have tried to assess the impact of 
migration and remittances on household strategies and welfare, particularly in the farm-
ing system context. Three links interact in this matter: remittances and investment, remit-
tances and production, and remittances, poverty, and income inequality. 
Converting remittances into investment determines their impact on development. 
Although remittances are most often used for consumption to satisfy basic subsistence 
needs, they also encourage investment, particularly in human capital, through health and 
education expenditures (Ozden and Schiff 2006). Remittances may be turned into in-
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vestment through the purchase of land, tools, or machinery or by helping to start a busi-
ness. Lucas (2005) shows that both cropping and livestock management improved in sev-
eral countries in Southern Africa in response to accumulated earnings of migrants who 
worked in South African mines. Azam and Gubert (2005) find that migration has en-
hanced the adoption of improved agricultural technology in Kayes village in Mali. Collier 
and Lal (1984) show that in rural Kenya remittances enable recipient families to hold 
more productive capital than other families. Studies like these bring out the role of migra-
tion and remittances as means of overcoming capital market imperfections and of bring-
ing home capital for funding productive investment. By contrast, Rempel and Lobdell 
(1978) use household survey data from rural Kenya and conclude that remittances from 
rural to urban migrants have little impact on the development of the region of origin. 
Another theoretical assumption is that a permanent flow of remittances creates an 
implicit insurance contract between migrants and their families. This can give rise to op-
portunistic behavior and to technical inefficiency among families in the country of origin. 
Azam and Gubert (2005) report such a case in the Kayes area in western Mali. Although 
migration has helped the adoption of improved technology there, migrant households do 
not exhibit better agricultural performance than nonmigrant households. 
The main issue here is whether remittances received are diverted into inefficient 
expenditures, such as fancy weddings and housing, and other unproductive assets in-
tended only to maintain the family’s prestige. 
The inability to finance expensive moves, such as moves overseas or those requir-
ing greater education, may prohibit the poor from relocating. Consequently, many of the 
micro remittance studies in Sub-Saharan Africa find that the poorest are rarely the major 
beneficiaries of remittances, at least directly (Lucas 2005). This underscores the fact that 
remittances are in the self-interest of the migrant (to protect an inheritance, to insure 
property, or to repay education costs) rather than altruistically motivated. Thus remit-
tances tend to be greater to families with more assets or higher incomes initially.  
Nonetheless, remittances may alleviate poverty, either directly through flows to 
the poor if not the poorest, or indirectly through any stimulant effect of remittances on the 
local economy. Lachaud (1999) estimates that international remittances to Burkina Faso 
reduce the poverty headcount by 7 percent in rural areas and by 3 percent in the urban 
sector. Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) examine remittances from Lesotho’s mine 
workers in South Africa and conclude that the prevalence of poverty in Lesotho would be 
15 percent greater in the absence of these remittances. Djajic (1986) argues that remit-
tances improve welfare in the country of migration origin, even of those who do not re-
ceive them, because remittances enlarge the set of possible exchanges of tradable and 
nontradable goods. Rivera-Batiz (1982), using a general equilibrium model, argues that 
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without remittances, those remaining behind incur a welfare loss. The set of possible 
transactions shrinks, because those remaining behind can no longer exchange nontradable 
goods with the migrants. 
In sum, studies yield ambiguous outcomes in terms of the net impact of migration 
and remittances on household welfare in the country of migration origin. The relationship 
between international migration and development in the home country has been described 
as an “unsettled” or “unresolved” relationship, as Ellerman (2003) notes. More empirical 
work is certainly needed. 
Migrants in receiving countries: development partners or development parasites? 
Voluntary migration—like any profit-motivated international movement of fac-
tors of production—is normally a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer 
(whoever is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant), and so is 
likely to be both economically efficient and beneficial to both parties. Indeed, the basic 
economic theory of migration is very similar to that of trade, and like trade, migration is 
generally expected to yield welfare gains. As Glover et al. (2001, p.4) notes, “As long as 
the marginal productivity of labor differs in various countries, the migration of labor is 
welfare improving.” If all markets are functioning well, there are no externalities, and 
there are no concerns about distributional implications, then migration is welfare-
improving not only for migrants, but (on average) also for natives.  
However, the presence of migrants is sometime a source of discomfort and divi-
sion in the host country. This xenophobia is rooted in the negative aspects of international 
migration, such as the persistence of unauthorized migration, criminal activities by mi-
grants, and problems of integration. A lack of information may reinforce public percep-
tions that international migration and its social consequences are beyond the control of 
state authorities and may give rise to anti-immigrant political parties, as already observed 
in some Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by the opportunity to 
work, creating a growing feeling in some host countries that native workers are harmed 
by migration. One focal point of the literature has been the impact of immigration on la-
bor markets in host countries. In general, migration increases the supply of labor (and 
human capital). In theory, this is likely to reduce wages for workers competing with mi-
grants and increase returns to capital and other factors complementary to migrant labor 
(Glover and others 2001). In general, this redistribution will favor natives who own fac-
tors of production that are complementary to migrants and hurt those who own factors of 
production that are substitutes. Thus a key question is whether migrants’ skills are substi-
tutes or complements for those of native workers. 
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According to a United Nations (UN 2006) report, migrants do not have a signifi-
cant impact on the labor market. The dynamic and multiplier effects of immigrants’ ac-
tivities will boost demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply that 
migrants induce. Because of such effects, migration inflows have been identified as a fac-
tor that increases economic growth to the benefit of the destination country and all its 
citizens. This is particularly the case if inflows of skilled workers relieve shortages in im-
portant sectors of the labor market. They may also increase the supply of labor in low-
skilled occupations that domestic residents are unwilling to fill, thus complementing 
rather than substituting for domestic labor. 
However, Glover and others (2001) maintain that this will happen only if markets 
are functioning well. Otherwise, it is theoretically possible for migration to generate 
higher unemployment for natives. For example, if native workers are not prepared to ac-
cept a wage below a given floor and migration induces the market wage for some native 
workers to drop below that floor, then migration could lead to an increase in native un-
employment. While overall output will not fall, output attributable to native workers may 
decline. Also, the closest substitutes to new immigrants in the labor markets are migrants 
who are already living and working in the receiving countries. They have most to lose 
from additional immigration. 
Migration may also have externalities that might affect the native population in a 
number of ways: 
• Congestion. Migrants could increase congestion in some areas, imposing costs di-
rectly on native workers and businesses.  
• Neighborhood benefits or disbenefits. Migrants could help regenerate depressed 
neighborhoods, or the reverse. 
• Intangible social and human capital. Migrants may have attributes such as entre-
preneurship that generate benefits for native workers. 
• Diversity. Native inhabitants may gain tangible or intangible benefits from inter-
acting with migrants from different backgrounds and cultures. 
Migration will also generate costs and benefits for the government, which can be 
viewed as another form of externality for native inhabitants—a collective rather than an 
individual one: 
• Consumption of public services. On the cost side, migrants will consume public 
services and may be entitled to some social security benefits. 
• Generation of tax revenues. On the benefit side, migrants will pay taxes, both di-
rect (if they are working) and indirect. 
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In general, conventional equilibrium analysis would suggest that supply responses 
would mitigate the effects of migration in the long run. However, it is possible to imagine 
cases (generally reflecting increasing returns to scale) in which the long-run impact of 
migration is greater than the short-run. For example, migrants might bring with them the 
knowledge and entrepreneurial ability to start a new industry or industry cluster, which 
then expands to employ native workers and to encourage them to start their own busi-
nesses in the same sector. 
Not enough is known about migrants’ social outcomes, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Migration brings negative aspects, but also enriches destination commu-
nities socially and culturally by bringing different ideas, customs, languages, cultural val-
ues, religions, academic contributions, and increased consumer choice. A key empirical 
question is in which context and conditions do negative or positive aspects predominate. 
Conclusion 
As a whole, remittances are estimated to be larger than all aid transfers in many 
countries of the region. Thus the potential developmental role of remittances should be an 
important topic for future policy research and experimentation. 
The effect of migration and remittances may be more pronounced for specific sec-
tors of the economy and population in sending and receiving countries. This could de-
pend on the economic and social environment; the speed, scale, and concentration of mi-
gration; the particular characteristics of the migrant and native populations; the extent to 
which migrants complement or are in competition with native workers; and the status of 
the migrants in their country of origin before their departure. All these aspects will need 
further investigation in order to capture the real overall outcome of migration and remit-
tances in the region. 
For individual countries of origin and destination it will be urgent first to identify 
a number of tangible positive and negative economic and social effects of migration. The 
attention being given to remittances by policymakers provides an opportunity to look at 
ways to increase the benefits that these flows provide. An immediate goal should be to 
disaggregate the impact of remittances by sector, method of transmission, and all other 
characteristics pertaining to migrants and their home family. As discussed in the follow-
ing section, policymakers also have an important regulatory role.  
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6. Institutions, Policies, and Regional Migrations  
 
International migration is increasingly viewed as a development issue. However, 
national and international migration policies do not yet fully reflect this development per-
spective and are sometimes inconsistent with other dimensions of development policy, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. In both countries of origin and countries of destina-
tion migration is not usually dealt with by the same ministry as development (UN 2005). 
Migration policy needs to be integrated into development policy, ensuring consistency 
and coherence between the two. 
National regulatory frameworks 
Before independence most countries in the region were sparsely populated, and 
demographic growth and population movements were not considered a problem by most 
countries. Following independence many governments enacted legislation to regulate 
movements across their borders and, in some case, to limit the number of resident for-
eigners (Miro and Potter 1980). 
Policies to regulate inflows have become increasingly refined in recent decades 
(Adepoju 1988), in part because governments have developed the legislative and admin-
istrative capacity to formulate and implement such measures and in part as a response to 
domestic political pressures—generated by chronic unemployment, sluggish economic 
growth, uneven income distribution, inflation, and political instability. Policy measures 
include quotas, border controls, visa and passport requirements, and indigenization poli-
cies. Doubts are now surfacing about whether such policies have produced the beneficial 
effects for the national population that were claimed for them (Miro and Potter 1980). 
Still, most international migration in Africa has occurred and still occurs outside any 
regulatory framework, because few countries have a well articulated policy on interna-
tional migration and even fewer seem to rigidly enforce their laws. 
Insights into attitudes and policies toward immigration are provided by periodic 
United Nations inquiries on government policies, conducted in conjunction with the UN 
Monitoring Report. Only 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa reported that they consider 
current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and all 12 report having policies 
to lower levels of immigration (table 1). The remainder reported that current levels of 
immigration are insignificant and satisfactory and that their policy is to maintain these 
flows. Equatorial Guinea, which reported that immigration was too low and that its policy 
was to raise it, recently revised this assessment following the discovery and exploitation 
of oil. 
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Table 1. Comparative views of levels of immigration by governments in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
Current levels of 
immigration are 
significant and too 
high 
Current levels of immigration are insignifi-
cant and satisfactory 
Current levels of 
immigration are 
too low 
Burundi, Comoros, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea Bissau, Si-
erra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Zim-
babwe 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Réunion, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia 
Equatorial Guinea 
 
 
Source: Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990. 
Most African governments have liberal policies toward the emigration of their 
own citizens. Freedom to emigrate is recognized and even explicitly provided for in some 
constitutions (Adepoju 1988). An important trend has been the development of policies in 
countries of origin to enhance the benefits that they derive from international migration 
and to reduce the costs they incur (UN 2005). Such policies include measures to facilitate 
migrants’ remittances, support to networks that link migrants to their country of origin, 
facilitation of return migration, strengthening of consular services, and in a few countries 
dual citizenship and the right of emigrants to vote abroad in national elections. 
In recent decades a main component of internal migration in Africa has been the 
involuntary movement of populations. Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant 
flows of forced migrants, including internally displaced people and victims of trafficking. 
Peace processes in several African countries suggest that attention needs to be turned to-
ward facilitating sustainable return. Despite increased awareness, a recent survey by the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 2005) indicates that fewer than half of the gov-
ernments in the region—21 of 43 responding countries—have taken any measures or 
adopted strategies to encourage repatriation, including changes in legislation to facilitate 
the reintegration of returning nationals to their communities.  
Around the world almost all countries have adopted national policies on interna-
tional migration to address an array of concerns. These include the effects of low fertility 
and population aging, unemployment, protection of human rights, social integration, 
xenophobia, national security, brain drain and brain gain, remittances, granting of asy-
lum, undocumented movements, and trafficking in people. However, enforcement of such 
legislation is still weak. 
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Regional integration, economic grouping, and migration 
While many bilateral and regional agreements on migration have been established 
in the region since the 1960s, most voluntary international population movements in Sub-
Saharan Africa do not occur within the framework of these agreements. For example, ac-
cords between Nigeria and the Spanish authorities sought to organize the migration of 
Nigerians to what is now Equatorial Guinea. In 1960 an agreement was concluded be-
tween Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Côte d’Ivoire to replace the former system of di-
rect recruitment by Ivorian employers. A 1973 agreement between Burkina Faso and Ga-
bon similarly sought to organize the flow of workers to Gabon (Russell, Jacobsen, and 
Stanley 1990). 
Bilateral approaches, although effective for advancing the interests of two gov-
ernments, have a narrow geographic focus and thus generally make only a limited contri-
bution to the regional or continental management of international population movements.  
Managing international migration has also become a high priority of regional and 
subregional groups. A number of regional consultative processes on international migra-
tion were initiated in the 1990s (UN 2005), as exemplified by the Migration Dialogue for 
Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). It 
is generally thought that the formation of regional economic groupings has reinforced 
these interregional migrations. 
In West Africa the regional organization that has most influenced migration is the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Established in 1975 by a 
treaty among Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
and Toga, ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of people and rights of residence 
and establishment. Some 97 percent of Côte d’Ivoire immigrants are citizens of 
ECOWAS signatory nations.  
The West African Economic Community (CEAO) is an international member of 
ECOWAS. CEAO was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Economic Union of West 
African States. The original members—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, and Senegal—were joined by Benin in 1984, and Togo has observer status. Under 
CEAO’s fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was 
signed on October 28, 1978 (the Bamako Protocol on Free Movement of People), which 
permits free circulation (entry, travel, residence, and exit) upon presentation of a valid 
passport. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1980 as a 
loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states in Southern Africa. The alliance, known as the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), had as its main aim 
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coordinating development projects to lessen economic dependence on South Africa, 
which was then under apartheid. The founding member states were Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The trans-
formation of the organization from a coordinating conference into a development com-
munity took place on August 17, 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia. The member states in-
clude the original alliance members plus the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagas-
car, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa. The process of ratification of the protocol to 
facilitate the free movement of people within SADC countries is well advanced, and the 
protocol will soon enter into force. 
The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organiza-
tion of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Formalized in 1948, this interterritorial coopera-
tion, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, provided a customs union and a common exter-
nal tariff, currency, and postage and dealt with common services in transport and com-
munications, research, and education. Following independence, these integrated activities 
were reconstituted. It has been called the East African Community since November 1999. 
EAC has recently introduced new East African passports and temporary passes to speed 
up population movement between countries in the region and a range of other initiatives 
to promote greater regional integration. This process supports and reinforces interregional 
migration. 
The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) also includes programs 
to foster labor mobility within Africa and sustained development of the region. This type 
of integration is likely to accelerate, paving the way for closer economic cooperation and 
labor migration in the region. 
Since international migration is not likely to decrease in volume or importance in 
the foreseeable future, governments have an interest in continuing to seek new forms of 
international cooperation in migration management. While bilateral, regional, and multi-
lateral approaches have their own strengths and limitations, the achievement of orderly 
migration calls for efforts at all levels, preferably in the context of an overarching, uni-
versally agreed and applied international framework. Less than one-third of the govern-
ments in Africa (12 of 43 countries) had ratified the International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families at the time 
of an ECA survey (2005). Even fewer countries had started implementing the conven-
tion—Algeria, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, and Sudan (ECA 
2005). 
Migration, democratization, and rebellion 
African societies and people are noted for their traditional hospitality to strangers. 
For many decades it was relatively easy for migrants to acquire foreign “citizenship.” 
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However, many migrants did not find it necessary, as they were well integrated into the 
host countries, coexistence was peaceful, and they paid little attention to arbitrary na-
tional borders. Ethnic groups, split into adjacent countries when the European powers 
partitioned Africa into “spheres of influence” at the Berlin conference in 1884, regarded 
movement across these “artificial” boundaries simply as an extension of internal migra-
tions, in line with long-standing ethnic solidarity. 
During the last decade many Sub-Saharan African countries have undergone de-
mocratic changes that have led to the emergence of multiple political parties. Suddenly, 
the right of migrants to vote became relevant. Political parties well-rooted in migrant 
communities (mainly opposition parties) have been supportive of the integration of mi-
grants in the political process, while “nationalist” parties (mainly the ruling party) have 
feared that migrants could swing the vote in favor of an opposition party with ethnic or 
religious alliances. In many countries this atmosphere has created turmoil, as political 
parties have behaved opportunistically, courting migrants to win an election or disenfran-
chising them when they are considered to back the opposition. 
Citizenship and nationality are becoming problems for many migrants. Some mi-
grants were brought to the host country by traffickers, to work as child laborers in slav-
ery-like conditions. After they were freed, they established themselves in the host coun-
try. Others were born in the receiving country and are the children or grandchildren of 
migrants. Most of them have lost family ties to their ancestors’ country of origin and lack 
citizenship in that country. At the same time they are prohibited from becoming citizens 
in the host country. 
In some countries this has led to an increase in the number of undocumented mi-
grants caught in a trap of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities. A recent UN 
Report (UN 2005) noted that many of these immigrants, lacking legal status in the receiv-
ing country, become victims of traffickers of all kind, who exploit the vulnerabilities such 
social conditions create. 
Another weapon used by politicians is manipulation of nationality and property 
rights. Increasingly, political leaders have used migrant status to reclassify longstanding 
residents as non-nationals and thus as ineligible to own land during the transformation of 
property rights that occurred in recent years in many countries. Communal land tenure 
systems prevail in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, with public ownership and private use 
rights of land (Razzaz 1993). Communities control access to land and individuals appro-
priate the use of land and the products and have descent rights to the land. The combina-
tion of communal control and private use rights over access to land allows families to 
have continuing use of the same land over time. However, there is still an absence of ju-
dicial legitimacy and legal security in these systems. Many countries including Burundi, 
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Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe began 
to consider legalizing land tenure and providing titles to informal settlements (Place and 
Migot-Adholla 1998). 
In many countries of the region, migrants appear to be the losers from such trans-
formation. According to Razzaz (1993), responding to risks of loss or opportunities for 
gain, actors might be tempted to create new facts on the ground and invest in alternative 
institutional arrangements. These new facts can explain the political disorder and rebel-
lion observed in some countries, including conflict and war in countries with a primary 
commodity dependence, such as diamonds, cocoa, or oil (Addison, Le Billon, and Mur-
shed 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2003). As argued by Collier (2003), primary commodity 
dependence often exposes countries to merchant-capital war, involving unregulated inter-
national trading networks using desperate migrant soldiers, sometimes with dramatic 
spillover effects, as illustrated by the arc of instability in West Africa from Liberia to Si-
erra Leone to Guinea to Côte d’Ivoire.  
Research in this area is remarkably scant. Migrants’ involvement in political af-
fairs in the host country is a sensitive issue that can affect the overall outcome of migra-
tion. Further investigations will certainly help to broaden the understanding of the ongo-
ing political instability in some receiving countries and predict the likely trend in other 
countries that have the same characteristics. 
Conclusion 
Although national and regional policies may have had an impact on interregional 
migration, the extent of their impact is unknown. There may also be a two-way relation-
ship between migration and policy change, as migration can also influence policy. Clari-
fying this relationship will help yield insight into the migration and policy nexus. Further 
research should thus examine the influence of policy change on in- and out-migration at 
both the national and the regional levels and the influence of migration on policy. Trends 
in regional economic integration should be used to predict the future picture of migration 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Public attitudes in a number of countries remain hostile to migrants. In some cases 
this hostility is exacerbated by unclear policies and programs on migrants. Governments 
and regional organization should work to reverse this trend by ensuring that all stake-
holders—countries of destination, countries of origin, transit countries, individuals who 
migrate, and those left behind—recognize that well-managed international migration can 
be mutually advantageous. The consequences for migration of political events such as 
democratization and elections, and the involvement of migrants in internal rebellion in 
some Africa countries, also deserve attention. Such analysis will illuminate the endoge-
nous relationship between migration and political change. 
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7. Migration and Social and Gender Issues 
 
International migration involves many social issues in sending and receiving 
countries as well as economic issues. 
Migration, health, and HIV/AIDS 
Malaria and AIDS are major threats to human health and to the social and eco-
nomic progress of individuals, communities, and countries in Africa. 
Each year malaria causes at least 1 million deaths, and there are an additional 
300–500 million clinical cases, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates. Ninety 
percent of malaria deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. High-risk groups include chil-
dren, pregnant women, travelers, refugees, displaced persons, and laborers entering en-
demic areas. Malaria is prevalent in 45 countries in Africa. The total direct and indirect 
costs of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded $2 billion, according to 1997 estimates. 
In countries with a heavy burden of malaria the disease may account for as much as 40 
percent of public health expenditure, 30–50 percent of in-patient admissions, and up to 50 
percent of out-patient visits. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is also the world’s most infected region for HIV/AIDS, with a 
profound impact at the individual, family, and community levels. An estimated 3.8 mil-
lion adults and children in Sub-Saharan Africa became infected with HIV during 2000, 
according to a Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) update of De-
cember 2000, bringing the number of people living there with HIV/AIDS at year’s end to 
25.3 million (Fluitman 2001; UNAIDS 2000). Regionally, Southern and Eastern Africa 
have the highest HIV prevalence (map 1). African economic development depends criti-
cally on the development and the effective deployment of its human resources, and both 
are seriously compromised by the pandemic, which has dramatic consequences in virtu-
ally all spheres of life 
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Map 1. Spread of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1984–99 
 
Source: FAO 2001.  
The high rates of HIV/AIDS infection in Africa create a nightmare scenario of 
acute labor shortages in key sectors of education and health, according to Adepoju 
(2004). This is keenly felt in the major labor-sending countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mo-
zambique, Swaziland, and Zambia,) and labor-receiving countries (Botswana and South 
Africa) of Southern Africa. However, it is also increasingly the case elsewhere in the re-
gion (Adepoju 2004). These acute labor shortages are now translating into more migra-
tion from skills-surplus countries, especially in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, and outside 
Africa.  
The HIV/AIDS pandemic adds new urgency to the problem of the emigration of 
health personnel from Sub-Saharan Africa. Many South African doctors and nurses emi-
grated to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted by 
higher incomes. In turn, an estimated 60 percent of Zimbabwean doctors recently moved 
to Botswana and South Africa. In Ghana nearly a quarter of health workers emigrated 
between 1995 and 2002 (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). This migration of a significant 
number of trained personnel increases the work load for the remaining few, thus contrib-
uting to the poorer health care in Ghana. 
The major causes of transmission of HIV in Africa are thought to be through het-
erosexual intercourse and through the placenta from an infected mother to her unborn 
baby. Other causes include blood transfusion and drug abuse (Adepoju 1994). Anecdo-
tally, migrants are accused of being a major vector in spreading HIV/AIDS. Further in-
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vestigation of these allegations will help to deepen understanding of the potential impact 
of migrations in spreading HIV/AIDS. 
Women in migration 
In most countries immigration regulations are not gender specific. Yet until re-
cently immigration laws and policies tended to assume that female migrants were secon-
dary migrants, moving to join other migrants rather than initiators of migration them-
selves. This assumption reflects the widespread traditional views in Sub-Saharan Africa 
of the status and role of women within the family and in society, which are related to the 
agricultural and economic system, which in turn is related to population density and tech-
nological levels (Boserup 1990). Women face discrimination and segregation, both in the 
organized labor market and in informal sector employment. They also have inferior legal 
rights in such matters as inheritance, land, and credit.  
A wide range of structural constraints and inequities prevent African women from 
participating more fully in migration. These include laws and cultural norms limiting 
their access to education, land, credit, productive inputs, information, and health care. 
Women’s literacy rates are considerably lower than men’s (Fluitman 2001). This sexual 
difference in privileges could explain early low involvement of women in international 
migration. 
However, the picture is changing. Where once migration worldwide consisted 
mainly of men performing physically demanding work in the industrial or agricultural 
sectors, now women are increasing involved in international migration. Lucas (2005) 
highlights this growing role of women in migration in Africa (table 2). In 1960 women 
made up less than 41 percent of the migrant stock in Africa; by 2000 they made up more 
than 47 percent. Adepoju (2005) also cites anecdotal evidence on the growing autono-
mous migration of women within Africa. Nonetheless, despite the general increase in 
women in migration in Africa, Southern Africa still has the lowest portion of female mi-
grants of any major region in the world, together with Western Asia. 
There are many reasons for women’s growing role. Migrant women have less ac-
cess to formal sector employment and must depend on work in the informal and unregu-
lated labor sectors, such as domestic work, small trade, entertainment, and prostitution, 
Tyldum, Tveit, and Brunovskis (2005) argue. The growing participation of native-born 
women in the labor force in many societies has led to an increased dependence on foreign 
workers for childcare, elder care, housekeeping, and other services traditionally per-
formed by housewives, increasing demand for migrants (Tyldum, Tveit, and Brunovskis 
2005). In the last decade, however, some professional women have emigrated from 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal to other parts of Africa and developed countries (Page and 
Plaza 2005).  
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Not much research has been conducted on gender and migration in Africa. Avail-
able information is scattered and incomplete. One study (Page and Plaza 2005) notes that 
for the West Africa region migration within the region is female-dominated, especially 
for Benin, The Gambia, and Togo. Migration to destinations outside the region is male 
dominated.  
Table 2. Share of women in the migrant stock, 1960–2000 
(percent) 
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
East Africa 41.9 43.1 45.2 47.2 48.1 
Middle Africa 45.3 46.0 46.3 46.3 46.2 
Southern Africa 30.1 30.3 35.6 38.6 42.2 
West Africa 41.5 42.8 43.6 46.7 47.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 40.8 42.1 44.0 46.0 47.2 
Source: UN Population Division data, cited by Lucas 2005. 
Migration and ethical issues: trafficking and child labor 
The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice distinguishes 
trafficking from migrant smuggling by the presence of force or coercion for purposes of 
exploitation. In a 2002 paper for the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Insti-
tutions the Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ 2002) argued that while human rights figure 
prominently in the discourse on trafficking, it is the connection between trafficking and 
migration—particularly illegal labor migration—that is the driving political force behind 
international antitrafficking efforts.  
Trafficking, like other forms of irregular migration, involves movements mainly 
from poorer countries to relatively wealthier ones. The gap between the number of people 
who wish to migrate and the legal opportunities for them to do so has created a demand 
that is being filled by traffickers and migrant smugglers operating in increasingly organ-
ized and successful ways. Migration occasioned by trafficking of women and child work-
ers is the second most lucrative business after gun running according to Makinwa-
Adebusoye (2006). 
Africa’s human trafficking and smuggling map is complicated, involving diverse 
origins within and outside the region. Today, analysts are looking into trafficking in chil-
dren (mainly for farm labor and domestic work within and across countries), trafficking 
in women and young people for sexual exploitation (mainly outside the region), and traf-
ficking in women from outside the region (for the sex industry of South Africa) (Adepoju 
2004). 
In several African countries newspapers recount stories about individual children 
sold practically as slaves. Slave-like arrangements have been reported about children 
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from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, yet no reasonable estimates 
exist of the size of this problem. Nevertheless, recent empirical work has been conducted 
to identify the causes and the characteristics of the phenomenon in some parts of the con-
tinent (Ouensovi and Kiellend 2001; IITA 2002; Kielland and Sanogo 2002; Nkamleu 
and Kielland 2006). 
A growing number of young people are involved in daredevil ventures to gain en-
try into Europe. Movements are more clandestine, involving riskier passage and traffick-
ing through diverse transit points, such as through Senegal to Spain by way of the Canary 
Islands. Individual stowaways engage in life-threatening trips hidden aboard ships des-
tined for southern Europe, and recently they have headed as far as East Asia. Unscrupu-
lous agents exploit these desperate youths with promises of passage to France, Italy, and 
Spain. 
Between 500,000 and 700,000 women and children are trafficked worldwide each 
year, according to Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006). For Africa as a whole the number of 
children subject to trafficking and to the worst forms of child labor is estimated at 80 mil-
lion. The most active source of child labor is West Africa, where children are taken from 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo to work on farms or in domestic service within the 
same region or in Central Africa and beyond (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). 
In West and Central Africa slave-like child labor is believed to be especially 
prevalent in rural areas, where the capacity to enforce minimum age requirements for 
schooling and work is lacking (Bonnet 1993; Grootaert 1998; Andvig 2001; Ranjan 
2001). In West Africa the main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked 
women and children are Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, according to Adepoju (2004). Traf-
ficked children are recruited through networks of agents to work as domestic servants in 
the informal sector and on plantations. Parents are often forced by poverty and ignorance 
to enlist their children, hoping to benefit from their wages to sustain the family’s deterio-
rating economic situation. Some children are indentured into “slave” labor in Mauritania 
and Sudan. In East Africa young girls and women abducted from conflict zones are 
forced to become sex-slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf 
States. South Africa is a destination for regional and extraregional trafficking activities. 
Women are trafficked through the network of refugees resident in South Africa; children 
are trafficked from Lesotho’s border towns, as are girls and women from Mozambique. 
Women are also trafficked from China, Thailand, and Eastern Europe to South Africa. 
Until very recently, almost no information was available on trafficking routes 
through and from Africa. Even today, the depth and quality of information available is 
relatively poor, although the situation is improving. The most likely explanation is that 
trafficking, particularly within Africa, is not given as high priority as elsewhere. As ar-
 38 
gued by ACJ (2002), African governments appear to be less concerned with irregular, 
nonpolitical border movements than their counterparts in Europe, Asia, or the Americas. 
Partly as a result of this disinterest and partly because of competing resource priorities, 
official data on trafficking within Africa is almost nonexistent, and administrative struc-
tures to protect, detect, and control these flows are often weak or underresourced. 
Conclusion 
Migration in Africa is dynamic and is becoming extremely complex and increas-
ingly feminized. International migration not only involves economic considerations but 
also touches some basic issues of freedom and individual rights. In thinking about policy 
on migration in Saharan Africa, it is important to investigate human trafficking, which 
seems to becoming a lucrative activity. Another area needing further scrutiny is the po-
tential impact of migration on the spread of HIV/AIDS, in both the country of origin and 
the country of destination. 
 
8. General Conclusions and Implications  
 
Over the last decades of the twentieth century international migration increased 
markedly worldwide. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where migration has always been an inte-
gral part of the social process, migration flows are largely temporary spurts associated 
with economic booms in destination countries or political events in countries of origin. 
An important feature in the region is that some former countries of emigration have be-
come destination countries, while economic and political events in other countries have 
led to large fluctuations in migration trends. Movements of refugees have been a major—
and in some cases, the main—component of international migration flows among coun-
tries. However, migration for economic reasons remains the most important component  
Large internal migration flows and their likely positive trend in the region clearly 
deserve more analysis. Needed are empirical documentation of such features as the mag-
nitude, composition, and place of destination of these flows and examination of their 
economic and social effects and the policy responses to them. This review of research 
and knowledge on international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa points to areas requiring 
research into policy actions needed for better management of migration in the region. 
Several features emerge from this review, as summarized below. 
Complexity of labor movements 
Migration has served as an integral part of labor markets and livelihoods across much of 
Africa for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, it has taken a num-
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ber of different forms. It has included internal, regional, and international movements and 
has cut across class and skill boundaries. Although African internal migration is still pri-
marily intraregional, it has recently expanded to a wide variety of alternative destinations 
and sometime to places without any historical, political, or economic links to the source 
countries of migration. This movement has also become more complex, varied, and spon-
taneous, with the feminization of migration and rising levels of both temporary and long-
term circulation. Moreover, much of the migration in Africa has occurred and is still oc-
curring outside of a regulatory framework.  
Recent estimates indicate that in 2005 migrants constituted 3 percent of the popu-
lation in West Africa, 1.6 percent in East and Central Africa, and 2.5 percent in Southern 
Africa. Refugees make up a particularly high percentage of migrants in Central and East 
Africa. 
Data gaps 
Although useful data exist and give a compelling picture of migration in the different re-
gions of the continent, there are still a number of key data gaps concerning migration and 
displacement within the regions. A deep understanding of migration flows remains a 
challenge. Data on the scale, structure, and characteristics of migrants in different regions 
are lacking, and this lack impedes investigation of the likely patterns of future expansion 
of migration. Estimates and numbers that the authors themselves claim they do not be-
lieve are still being used in the literature. While census data could reveal more about mi-
gration scale, dedicated migration surveys will also be needed to understand the migra-
tion process. 
Underlying forces 
Migration can be viewed as a response to economic incentives arising largely from dis-
equilibria between and within sectors of the economy and between countries and regions. 
The growing body of literature on migration seems to be reaching a consensus that eco-
nomic considerations are of primary importance in the decision to migrate and that peo-
ple migrate ultimately to improve their well-being. However, while there is consensus on 
the benefits of an open trade regime and relatively liberal capital movement, that consen-
sus rarely extends to the free movement of people across countries. 
Recent debates of the effect of migration in Sub-Sahara Africa still focus on the 
emigration of qualified professionals (the brain drain) and the subsequent brain gain in 
receiving countries. There is still doubt whether brain drain is a serious problem for many 
African countries. The likely impact of such brain drain, or brain gain, or both, depends 
of a set of social and economic parameters. Central questions are: How productively were 
the highly skilled workers employed before their departure? Are higher wages induced 
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for those left behind? Does the departure of workers induce new internal migration to re-
place them? What is the nature of technology and hence the extent of substitution that 
might occur in both receiving and sending countries? What is the extent of external costs 
and benefits of emigration and immigration of the highly skilled? Also, little is known 
about the number and the internal destinations of migration on the continent. Information 
is still lacking on composition by skill level, gender, and legal status and on sectoral con-
centration. The complex relationships between in-continent migration, training, and labor 
markets change need more exploration. 
Individuals belonging to different families, communities, ethnicities, and coun-
tries exhibit remarkably different behavior with respect to the incentives to migrate. 
Members from some communities respond quickly to economic incentives and seem less 
worried about losing “social capital” in the sending site. In contrast, members from other 
communities are reluctant to leave their environment, even in the presence of strong eco-
nomic incentives. While economists and others have attributed these differences to unob-
servable institutional, cultural, or individual characteristics, this raises issues of the role 
of information networks in transmitting impulses about the range of available opportuni-
ties, of the ease of migrating despite intervening obstacles and barriers, and of the role of 
the family as the decisionmaking body for individual migration. Again, more research is 
needed to inform the academic and policy debates on the matter. 
Remittances 
In contrast with the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain are the financial 
transfers to the home country sent by migrants to their families. This subject has 
prompted a lively debate in the literature about the costs and benefits of migration. One 
central issue is the expenditure of remittances. Some argue that increased income is not 
increased development. Much remittance spending is sterile for developmental purposes: 
it is channeled into nonlocal expenditures or conspicuous consumption. Others stress the 
link between remittances and investment. 
Data on remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa remain poor. The best starting point 
would be to collect consistent cross-sectional and dynamic data before undertaking any 
serious analysis. Investment in monitoring systems would be helpful because most remit-
tances on the continent flow through informal channels.  
The dynamics of social relationships among migrants and their home and host so-
cieties are complex and represent an important research challenge. In addition to sending 
remittances, migration affects the social fabric of both home and host societies. Studies 
show that migrants tend to be net contributors to fiscal revenue. A central question is 
whether the sums that migrants pay in taxes are greater than what they cost the state in 
welfare payments, education, and additional infrastructure. Moreover, migrants create 
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and maintain other, broader forms of contact with their host country and their country of 
origin. These may generate flows of knowledge, investment, and trade to and from those 
countries. Quantification of these flows will be a step forward in the analysis of migration 
outcomes. 
Policies to lower remittance fees through some degree of deregulation of remit-
tance intermediaries could enhance the benefits from migration. Yet responses to existing 
policy incentives have not been seriously investigated. Financial service deregulation will 
have some costs, implying that the elasticity of remittances with respect to these costs 
needs to be known before any recommendation can be made.  
Regional responses 
Countries in the region have started taking international migration seriously in their poli-
cies and programs. The complexity of international migration and its growing scale have 
compelled governments to move from unilateral approaches to regional consultative 
processes. Examples are the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the 
Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). At the international level the United 
Nations system and other multilateral institutions have undertaken a variety of activities 
for addressing international migration issues.  
Beyond a few conventions and protocols Sub-Saharan Africa lacks a comprehen-
sive framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive, continental response to 
migration issues. To this end, at least two issues urgently need attention. Adoption of 
standard definitions and sharing of knowledge on international migration is a necessary 
first step. Then mechanisms to deal with refugees and undocumented migrants need to be 
continuously evaluated, as the refugee problem is a dynamic phenomenon. 
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Table A.2. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international mi-
grants as a share of the population, West Africa 
(percent) 
Country  1975–80 1980–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2000 2000–05 
West Africa Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 3.6 –2.5 5.0 5.8 1.4 1.0 
 Migrants as share 
of population 3.3 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.1 2.9 
Benin 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 2.6 3.3 2.4 13.0 –1.8 5.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.4 1.9 2.1 
Burkina Faso 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 9.4 9.4 4.6 5.9 4.2 6.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.6 3.7 4.0 4.7 5.1 5.8 
Cape Verde 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –0.3 1.8 3.2 3.4 0.2 0.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 18.2 15.8 15.4 15.7 14.0 13.1 
The Gambia 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
 
Migrants as of 
population 11.6 12.2 12.6 13.3 14.1 15.3 
Ghana 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.8 3.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 2.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 3.7 3.7 4.6 5.9 7.6 7.5 
Guinea 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.5 1.5 11.9 15.5 –3.4 –11.9 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.3 4.1 6.5 11.6 8.7 4.3 
Guinea-Bissau 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.5 –0.4 1.9 16.6 –10.0 –0.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.7 1.4 1.2 
Liberia 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 4.8 0.6 –0.5 18.0 –4.4 –23.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.3 3.8 3.8 9.3 5.2 1.5 
Mali 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –2.9 –2.9 –0.5 1.0 –5.3 –0.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Mauritania 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 5.1 5.1 15.3 4.5 –12.6 1.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.1 2.4 4.6 5.1 2.4 2.1 
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Niger 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.8 –2.8 0.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.9 
Nigeria 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 12.5 –26.6 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Senegal 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –5.2 7.1 10.9 1.7 –1.5 1.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.0 2.5 3.7 3.5 2.9 2.8 
Sierra Leone 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 2.0 2.0 2.6 –14.4 –3.1 18.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.3 1.0 2.2 
Togo 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.0 
Note: The growth rate of the immigrant stock estimates the average exponential growth rate of the interna-
tional migrant stock over each period indicated. 
Source: UN 2006. 
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Table A.3. Refugees as a share of international  
migrants, by region 
(percent) 
Year 
Eastern 
Africa 
Central 
Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Western 
Africa 
1960 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 
1965 6.9 14.9 0.0 1.9 
1970 9.3 27.9 0.4 3.2 
1975 12.4 31.1 0.3 5.9 
1980 42.9 42.6 2.1 1.3 
1985 38.7 30.0 1.4 0.4 
1990 54.6 29.3 2.9 9.5 
1995 43.7 62.0 7.6 22.0 
2000 36.0 35.2 2.8 10.8 
2005 32.9 38.8 3.2 5.1 
Source: UN 2006. 
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Table A.4. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international mi-
grants as a share of the population, Central Africa 
(percent) 
Country  1975–80 1980–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2000 2000–05 
Central Africa Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.6 –4.4 –0.6 11.6 –11.6 3.2 
 Migrants as share 
of population 3.6 2.5 2.1 3.2 1.6 1.6 
Angola 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 21.5 3.8 –23.6 2.2 4.1 4 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Cameroon 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1 0.8 
Central African 
Republic 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Chad 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.8 28.6 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 4.5 
Congo, Rep. of 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.8 6.4 7.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of  
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.7 –7.7 –0.3 16.0 –21.0 –5.7 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.9 2.9 2.4 4.6 1.4 0.9 
Equatorial Guinea 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –6.5 –6.5 –6.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 2.4 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 
Gabon 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 8.5 3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 13.6 13.5 13.3 14.7 16.5 17.7 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.6 5.2 4.8 
Source: UN 2006. 
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Table A.5. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international mi-
grants as a share of the population, East Africa 
(percent) 
Country  1975–80 1980–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2000 2000–05 
East Africa Growth rate of 
immigrant stock  8.0 –2.1 5.6 –3.8 –1.9 –0.1 
 Migrants as share 
of population 3.5 2.7 3.1 2.2 1.8 1.6 
Burundi 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 9.4 8.6 –0.6 –2.4 –26.9 5.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 5.4 7.0 5.9 4.8 1.2 1.3 
Comoros 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 11.2 11.2 5.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.7 7.0 7.7 8.6 8.7 8.4 
Djibouti 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 54.1 –13.3 20.9 –10.4 –4.2 –6.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 11.9 5.2 10.6 5.8 4.0 2.6 
Eritrea 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.2 1.6 2.4 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Ethiopia 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.6 7.3 13.7 –7.5 –3.6 –3.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.1 1.3 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.7 
Kenya 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –0.1 –1.1 –0.8 18.4 –2.2 1.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.0 
Madagascar 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Malawi 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –0.2 –0.2 28.0 25.4 –3.0 –0.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.6 3.9 12.2 3.2 2.4 2.2 
Mauritius 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.7 
Mozambique 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 20.8 –10.9 13.9 14.0 8.0 2.0 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.1 
Réunion 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 6.4 7.9 9.7 11.9 14.6 18.1 
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Rwanda 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 2.3 8.9 –1.9 –3.8 7.8 6.2 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 
Somalia  
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 94.7 –14.6 –4.0 –70.7 3.5 51.1 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 24.8 12.0 9.5 0.3 0.3 3.4 
Uganda 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –2.7 –1.3 –2.8 2.1 –2.9 –0.4 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 5.4 4.3 3.1 2.9 2.2 1.8 
Tanzania 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –1.7 –0.3 1 13.5 –4.7 –2.4 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 3.0 2.5 2.2 3.7 2.6 2.1 
Zambia 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock –1.3 0.2 –0.1 –0.7 5.5 –5.3 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 4.6 3.9 3.3 2.8 3.3 2.4 
Zimbabwe 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.0 2.8 3.9 –4.6 0.6 –5 
 
Migrants as share 
of population 7.9 7.4 7.6 5.4 5.2 3.9 
Source: UN 2006. 
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Table A.6. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international mi-
grants as a share of the population, Southern Africa 
(percent) 
Country  1975–80 1980–85 1985–90 1990–95 1995–2000 2000–05 
Southern Africa Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 1.0 11.7 –6.2 –2.2 –0.6 1.7 
 Migrants as share of 
population 3.3 5.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.6 
Botswana 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 2.7 5.6 6.4 7.0 7.2 7.2 
 
Migrants as share of 
population 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.2 4.5 
Lesotho 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 17.3 10.7 –16.8 –6.2 1.4 1.5 
 
Migrants as share of 
population 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Namibia 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 7.0 7.0 7.0 0.7 2.9 0.1 
 
Migrants as share of 
population 6.0 7.5 8.5 7.5 7.5 7.1 
South Africa 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 0.4 12.3 –7.9 –2.2 –1.4 1.6 
 
Migrants as share of 
population 3.4 5.5 3.3 2.6 2.2 2.3 
Swaziland 
Growth rate of 
immigrant stock 3.9 3.9 11.4 –12.9 1.8 1.8 
 
Migrants as share of 
population 5.5 5.7 8.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 
Source: UN 2006. 
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